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Abstract
Personal protective equipment (PPE) stockpiles in the United States were established to facilitate 
rapid deployment of medical assets to sites affected by public health emergencies. Large quantities 
of PPE were introduced into US stockpiles because of the need to protect healthcare and other 
professionals during these events. Because most stockpiled PPE was acquired during, or 
immediately following, large-scale public health events, such as pandemic influenza planning 
(2005-2008), SARS (2003), H1N1 (2009-10), and Ebola (2014-15), aging PPE poses a significant 
problem. PPE such as N95 filtering face piece respirators were not designed to be stored for long 
periods, and much of the currently stored PPE has exceeded its manufacturer-assigned shelf life. 
Given the significant investment in the procurement and storage of PPE, along with projections of 
consumption during public health emergencies, discarding large quantities of potentially viable 
PPE is not an attractive option. Although shelf-life extension programs exist for other stockpiled 
medical assets, no such option is currently available for stockpiled PPE. This article posits 
stockpile quality assurance sampling plans as a mechanism through which shelf-life extension 
programs for stockpiled PPE may be achieved. We discuss some of the nuances that should be 
considered when developing a plan tailored to stockpiles and provide basic decision tools that may 
be used in the context of a quality assurance program tailored to stockpiled PPE. We also explore 
basic information by comparing and contrasting different sample size options.
STOCKPILES REPRESENT an important component of the United States’ public health 
infrastructure and are a strategic component of many federal, state, and local public health 
agencies.1,2 Throughout the United States, stockpiles were established to store large 
quantities of inventory to quickly supply healthcare and emergency response professionals 
responding to public health events. The placement of stockpiles in strategic locations 
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facilitates the rapid deployment of medical assets needed in countermeasure efforts. US 
stockpiles were established through federal funding and initiatives associated with the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188), 
which followed the terror attacks of 2001.1 This initiative enhanced appropriations for public 
health throughout the United States and facilitated the creation of stockpiles at all levels of 
government and in nongovernment healthcare settings.1
Since their widespread establishment in the early 2000s, the role of US stockpiles in the 
nation’s public health strategy and infrastructure has become institutionalized. Over time, in 
many instances, stored inventory has been expanded to include large quantities of personal 
protective equipment (PPE). PPE—including respirators, gloves, and surgical gowns—was 
introduced into US stockpiles primarily to protect healthcare professionals and first 
responders on the frontlines of treatment and containment.3 Large volumes of PPE were 
introduced due to utilization rates and shortages experienced by hospitals and healthcare 
providers during actual and simulated public health emergencies and pandemics.4-13
Much of the currently stockpiled PPE was acquired in response to high-consequence public 
health events such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, 2005-2008 
pandemic influenza planning, the 2009-10 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and the 2014-15 
Ebola outbreak.2,4 Thus, due to the significant financial investments required for 
procurement and storage, which are often viewed as prohibitive, stockpiled PPE have, in 
some cases, been stored beyond their manufacturer-recommended shelf life.
Although shelf-life extension programs exist for other stockpiled medical assets, no such 
manufacturer-approved or government-sanctioned program is currently available for 
stockpiled PPE. Formal programs are in place to extend the manufacturer-assigned shelf life 
for stockpiled phar-maceuticals, since it has been empirically demonstrated that their actual 
shelf life can be much longer if they are stored properly.14,15 The motivation to develop and 
implement the pharmaceutical Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) emerged during the 
mid-1980s when the military realized that extending the shelf life of medicines could help 
solve the supply and demand challenges they experienced.14 Since its adoption, SLEP has 
proved to be effective at reducing the logistical burden and replacement costs of valuable 
medical assets held in US stockpiles.14,15 An important contributor to the success of this 
program, however, was verification of product quality prior to shelf-life extensions being 
granted. In the context of stockpiled PPE, the paucity of research and initiatives related to 
quality assurance may be a hindrance in the development of a PPE-tailored SLEP.
In this article, we posit stockpile quality assurance sampling plans as a mechanism through 
which shelf-life extension programs for stockpiled PPE may be realized. In doing so, we 
discuss some of the nuances that a plan tailored to stockpiles should consider and provide 
basic decision tools that may be used in the context of a quality assurance program tailored 
to stockpiled PPE. We also compare and contrast different sample size options.
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Quality Assurance of Stockpiled PPE
An effective effort to develop a quality assurance initiative suitable to stockpiled PPE should 
consider the context. Stockpiles typically store numerous manufacturers’ models of similar 
PPE. For each model, a manufacturer assigns a single batch or lot number under the same set 
of manufacturing parameters during the same period. Therefore, PPE units with the same lot 
number share a consistent expiry date and may be expected to have relatively uniform 
quality. Stockpiles are likely to store numerous lots of various sizes for each model.
An adequate evaluation of PPE performance typically requires destructive testing in order to 
assess its protective properties. While testing samples composed of a large number of units 
will result in higher confidence in population estimates, depleting the stock of critical assets 
through excessive testing is not ideal. Further, given the associated expense of testing 
stockpiled PPE, a performance evaluation program should balance costs of testing and 
respirator attrition with a level of accuracy that is sufficient to ensure stockpiled PPE 
continue to meet regulatory guidelines.
Lot Quality Assurance Sampling
Lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS), a quality assurance process that may be most 
suitable for stockpiled PPE, originated in the manufacturing industry for quality control 
purposes and has been adopted in numerous quality assurance contexts since its inception.
16,17
 LQAS uses a sample of items to estimate the quality of the lot instead of testing each of 
the items. LQAS is designed to facilitate decisions to accept or reject the entire lot based on 
the results of single or multiple samples, an approach that keeps sampling costs to a 
minimum.18 This approach is consistent with a stratified random sampling technique, but the 
samples are purposefully smaller than would be necessary to provide narrow confidence 
intervals for each stratum or lot.18,19 In contrast, LQAS enables lot quality decisions to be 
made based on probabilities.18,19 Given that stockpiles store a population of PPE items that 
can be delineated by numerous lots of distinct manufacturer models, LQAS’s approach of 
randomly sampling a small numbers of units in each stratum fits the context nicely. Figure 1 
depicts a hypothetical stockpile stratified random sampling design for N95 filtering face 
piece respirators using a quality assurance program grounded in the LQAS approach. This 
technique divides the entire population of N95 respirators into nonoverlapping 
subpopulations of lots that are expected to share quality commonalities. The manufacturer-
assigned lot number represents the homogenous level quality needed to characterize each 
stratum in a stockpile’s LQAS plan.
Sampling done at the lot level implies that the test results will generalize to the lot; however, 
LQAS is also designed to allow information at each level to be combined and inferences to 
be made at higher levels. For example, the estimates of quality for all units that share a 
common manufacturer model can be made by combining the results of samples 
corresponding to particular lots. Accurate estimates at the higher level can be obtained by 
weighting the results obtained at lower levels according to their relative percentage in the 
population.
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In a stratified random sampling approach context, the random selection of units from 
subpopulations ensures that the estimates of quality derived are unbiased. This means that, 
although the estimate from a single sample can be very different from the true quality level, 
the average of the sample proportions from repeated sampling should equal the true quality 
level that exists in the subpopulation. When units are not randomly selected from a 
population, bias in the estimated population parameter is likely. A potential challenge in 
using a stratified random sampling approach is the need to fully account for the inventory of 
PPE units in each stockpile. A true random process would require that each PPE item has an 
equal probability of being selected for sampling.
A potentially useful adaptation of the LQAS method is the adoption of “double sampling.” 
This approach divides the chosen sample size into 2 equal, smaller samples: n1 and n2. A 
random sample of size n1 is selected during the first stage. If the results of this sample are 
not conclusive, a second random sample is obtained (n2), and conclusions are based on the 
results of the combined sample (n1 + n2).18,19
Quality Evidence for Stockpiled PPE
In the context of a PPE-specific LQAS, focused information should be provided as evidence 
relating to its quality. Numerous consensus standards designed to evaluate the initial quality 
of the various types of PPE may be referenced as a starting point. Table 1 shows the tests 
that may be considered when assessing N95 filtering face piece respirators and gowns for 
their protective qualities.
For N95 respirators, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) 
standard testing procedures (STPs) may be used to assess and compare the quality of 
stockpiled respirators to approved levels of initial quality. These standard testing procedures 
have an assigned level of quality for breathing resistance and filtration efficiency that can be 
used to assign a dichotomous quality attribute to each item. In its attribute form, each unit is 
categorized as either being defective or not in relation to the criteria in each standard. Any of 
the tests shown in Table 1 can result in this assigned attribute. The LQAS method requires 
that the test results corresponding to each attribute be tabulated in the form of the proportion 
of defective units in each sample. This sample proportion is then used to make decisions 
regarding the overall quality of the lot.
Decision Rationales in LQAS
The decision rationales center on the number of defective items that need to be found in a 
sample before the lot is deemed unacceptable; the rationales are grounded in the risks that 
stockpile managers are willing to accept.18 Implied in this framework is the premise that 
stockpile managers should first have some sense of the minimum proportion of defective 
units in a lot they are not willing to exceed. It can be assumed that the desired quality level 
in each stockpile lot is 0% failing units. Given that there is some probability of defect in new 
units, however, more realistic expectations that incorporate some level of defective units 
should be considered.
Once the desired level of quality is chosen, the acceptable level of risk of rejecting a lot that 
meets the desired quality level must be selected. Because rules governing attribute quality 
Yorio et al. Page 4
Health Secur. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 March 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
data are based on the binomial distribution, the probability of obtaining an exact number of 
defective units in any sample size can be calculated, assuming that the true number of 
defective units in a lot was at a desired level.* The rejection risk, often identified as the type 
I error rate (α), is the probability of rejecting a lot that actually meets the quality level 
deemed appropriate by stockpile management. This level of risk is commonly set at 5%.20 In 
other words, a satisfactory lot would be incorrectly rejected less than 5% of the time. Figure 
2 depicts the expected probabilities and the cumulative probability for obtaining an exact 
number of defective units in a sample of 32 taken from a lot in which 15% of the PPE units 
were defective.
After some consideration is given to the desired level of quality and the rejection risk, units 
from the lot can be sampled and tested. The number of units that failed in the sample can 
then be used to determine the likelihood that the sample was taken from a lot that exceeded 
the proportion of defective units deemed acceptable. As depicted in Figure 2, if a rejection 
risk of 5% is selected, it may be concluded that a sample of 32 that resulted in 9 or more 
defective units was likely sampled from a lot that exceeded 15% defective units. If stockpile 
management determined 15% defective units in any given lot to be the maximum number 
they are willing to accept and set the rejection risk (α) to 5%, a finding of 9 or more defects 
in the sample indicates that the lot may be rejected or that a second round of testing may be 
helpful to obtain additional evidence.
In the LQAS method, the probabilities for finding a different number of defective units can 
be computed for any sample size and maximum number of defects that stockpile managers 
deem acceptable. Figure 2 shows the expected probabilities for only a single scenario in 
which a sample of 32 PPE items was taken from a lot with 15% defective units. In Table 2, 
probabilities are provided for obtaining a specific number of failures in sample sizes of 10, 
12, 18, 24, and 32, assuming the true number of defects in the lot were 15% and 5%.
Although not exhaustive of all possibilities, the table is meant to represent a simple tool that 
can be used to determine when the proportion of defects in a lot is likely to have exceeded 
the maximum number they are willing to accept. To illustrate, assume a stockpile 
management team deemed that a sample of 18 PPE items could be used to determine if the 
number of defects in a lot was likely greater or less than 5%. If 18 PPE items were randomly 
sampled from the lot and tested, and 3 of the 18 failed the performance test, the best guess 
estimate of the true lot fail rate is 3/18 or ~ 16.7%. However, we know that, based on 
sampling variability, 3 defects out of a sample of 18 PPE items can occur for a wide range of 
true lot quality. By consulting Table 2, it can be seen that samples of 18 PPE items from a lot 
in which 5% of the units are defective will result in 0, 1, or 2 failures a little over 94% of the 
time (ie, the sum of the probabilities of observing exactly 0, 1, and 2 failures). The 
likelihood of observing 3 failures out of 18 PPE items is relatively small—only 4.7% of the 
time, and a little over 5% of the total samples will result in 3 or more failures. Thus, while 
there is a possibility that this sample of 18 PPE units may have been taken from a lot with 
*P(x ∣ ρ) = n!x!(n − x)! (1 − ρ)
(n − x)ρx, where P(x∣ρ) = the probability of observing a given number of PPE items fail (x) in a 
sample of size (n) given the true lot fail rate (ρ).
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5% defective units, it is reasonable to conclude that the number of defects in the lot likely 
exceeds 5%. The rows for samples of 18 that resulted in 3 or more failures are shaded in 
Table 2, given that the sum of the expected probabilities for observing 3 or more failures out 
of a sample of 18 items from a lot with 5% defective units is around 5%. In Table 2, 5% 
cutoffs are highlighted for reference.
Sample Size Considerations
There are tradeoffs that need to be managed between the resources (time and money) 
available to administer the quality assurance program and the precision desired to draw 
quality conclusions. The goal of the LQAS method is to determine which lots have 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of quality. This allows for less emphasis to be placed on 
establishing population parameters within a desired level of precision—which requires large 
samples to derive narrow confidence intervals around the estimated population proportion of 
defective units.18 This nuance allows for relatively smaller sample sizes to be used and, in-
turn, reduces the waste experienced through destructive testing and the cost associated with 
testing stockpiled PPE.
Since a random sampling approach provides unbiased estimates of lot quality, eventually the 
average quality level revealed through repeated samples will equal the true quality level of 
the lot. However, the results of individual samples may be quite different from the true 
quality level in the lot. In the context of stockpile quality assurance sampling programs—
with a large number of lots, destructive testing, and limited resources—decisions regarding 
lot quality will likely be made based on a small number of samples. One area of interest, 
therefore, concerns the accuracy of different sample sizes in estimating the true quality level 
when the number of repeated samples is restricted. Although LQAS is a well-developed 
quality assurance technique, little empirical attention has been devoted to comparing and 
contrasting different sample sizes.
In order to compare and contrast different sample sizes considering an LQAS specific to 
stockpiled PPE, we ran a series of simple computer-based experiments and examined the 
sampling distribution of the proportion of defective units for different sample sizes taken 
from lots with known quality levels. Three different lots consisting of 100,000 PPE items 
were created. Each lot was simulated to have a different number of defective units—1%, 5%, 
and 15%. For example, in the 5% defective lot, 5% or 5,000 of the numbers were set to be 
ones—representing defective PPE items—and the remaining 95,000 (95%) were set to be 
zeros—nondefective PPE items. Once the 3 lots were generated, random samples of 5, 10, 
12, 18, 24, 32, 40, 50, and 100 units were selected from them; 75 distinct samples of each 
sample size with replacement were taken from each simulated lot. Although 75 repeated 
samples from the same lot far exceeds a realistic number of repeated samples, they were 
used to generate estimates of sample-to-sample variability that could be statistically 
compared and contrasted among the different sample sizes.
We initially examined quality estimate for each sample size, noting the number of repeated 
samples required to derive an accurate estimate of the true defective rate in the lot. The 
estimated number of defective units in the lot derived from samples 1 through 10 is 
presented in Table 3. The table shows that, after a single sample, the estimated proportion of 
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defects in each lot can be quite different from the actual true number for most of the sample 
sizes. In Table 3, the column corresponding to 2 repeated samples shows the average of the 
first and second fail rates. Further, the column corresponding to 3 repeated samples shows 
the average of the first, second, and third samples, and so on. These columns reveal that even 
after numerous repeated samples, the estimated number of defective units in the lot can be 
much different from the true proportion of defective units in the lot. This suggests that 
relying on a small number of repeated samples to estimate lot quality levels can be 
problematic with relatively smaller sample sizes.
These observations support the use of probabilities to determine when lot quality is likely to 
exceed acceptable levels included in the LQAS approach. However, the differences in the 
variability of quality estimates for each sample size across the number of repeated samples 
shown in Table 3 suggests that some sample sizes may be better suited for use in an LQAS 
approach specific to stockpiled PPE.
Corresponding to each sample size, Table 4 highlights the sample-to-sample variability that 
was observed across the entire set of 75 repeated samples. The range depicts how extreme 
the observed fail rates can get depending on sample size. For each of the simulated lots, a 
sample size of 5 resulted in the greatest range in the percent of defective units observed. In 
general, the range decreased as the sample size increased. Similarly, the sample-to-sample 
dispersion was greatest where the sample size was equal to 5 and generally decreased as the 
size of the random sample increased. The average percent of defective units across the 75 
samples and their standard deviations are shown in Figure 3. Consistent with the results 
presented in Table 4, Figure 3 shows that for each sample size, the mean percentage of 
defective items observed across the 75 samples was fairly accurate, while the standard 
deviation generally decreased as the sample size increased.
Next, the sample-to-sample variances were statistically compared and contrasted. This 
process allows us to group sample sizes that resulted in similar and different variances (ie, 
those not statistically different and those statistically different, respectively). The results of 
these pairwise comparisons are also reported in Table 4. Considering the results in each of 
the 3 simulated lots collectively, 3 distinct groups of sample sizes could be delineated based 
on similar characteristics in their variability: group 1 consisted of sample sizes of 10 and 12 
PPE units; group 2 consisted of 18, 24, and 32 units; and group 3 consisted of 40 and 50 
units. The magnitude of the benefits of group 3 were de-pendent on the true number of 
defective units in the lot and were maximized as this number increased. The sample sizes of 
5 and 100 displayed outcome characteristics that differed from the overall groupings and 
resulted in the greatest and least variability, respectively.
Conclusions
Throughout this article, we positioned quality assurance as a potential mechanism to manage 
aging PPE currently stored in US stockpiles. We demonstrated that relying on a small 
number of repeated samples to estimate lot quality levels can be problematic with relatively 
smaller sample sizes. In response, we posited LQAS as a quality assurance framework that 
has potential applicability in this context. The LQAS approach advocates the use of 
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probabilities to determine when lot quality is likely to have exceeded an acceptable, a priori, 
agreed upon level.
Grounded in the LQAS approach, Table 2 illustrates how the results of small samples can be 
assessed in relation to expected probabilities if the true lot quality was assumed. The tables 
represent a set of tools that can be used as a basis for decision making in an LQAS specific 
to stockpiled PPE. In Table 2 expectations for sample sizes of 10 to 32 and true lot fail rates 
of 5% and 15% were included. The approach used to develop Table 2, however, can be used 
to derive theoretical expectations for any sample size and any maximum number of defective 
units in a lot that is deemed acceptable.
Although LQAS is a well-developed quality assurance technique, little empirical attention 
has been devoted to comparing and contrasting different sample sizes. Thus, we also 
examined the question of sample size through a set of simple experiments. We found that 
sample sizes could be grouped together in terms of the variability with which they estimated 
the true number of defective units in a lot. Collectively, the findings related to sample size 
and the tools provided can be used by stockpile managers to begin the process of developing 
an LQAS specific to stockpiled PPE.
In order to maximize the prospect that the quality evidence accumulated by stockpiles can be 
used to inform a SLEP specific to stockpiled PPE, most of the parameters in the LQAS (eg, 
levels of risk assumed, sample size, schedules of repeated sampling, and the maximum 
number of defects in a lot deemed acceptable) should be subject to a formal consensus 
process overseen by representatives from PPE manufacturers, state and local departments of 
health, and privately held stockpiles. Manufacturer involvement in the design of a PPE-
specific LQAS for stockpiles may maximize the prospect of a formal shelf-life extension 
program.
In this formal consensus setting process, contingencies also need to be established that 
define steps to be taken in lieu of the quality evidence found. If quality evidence is found 
that suggests that the lot tested is acceptable, decision rationales should be in place to inform 
possible extension for products beyond the manufacturer’s labeled or recommend use date. 
PPE cannot provide expected protections indefinitely, thus decisions to hold product should 
reflect extensions based on quality evidence coupled with any expected degradation. As 
such, if quality evidence warrants a shelf-life extension for particular lots of PPE, effort 
should be made to use the older products and replenish them with new stock. Consistent 
with the currently implemented SLEP for pharmaceuticals, PPE products with granted 
extensions to the shelf life that are released to the public may require relabeling and/or 
communication strategies to ensure that the end users understand that the product may be 
used beyond its labeled expiration date. Conversely, if quality evidence is found that 
suggests that the lot tested is or may be un-acceptable, contingencies should include the 
option of discarding the lot or for a repeat testing to gather additional evidence.
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Figure 1. 
PPE sampling depiction for stockpiles based on the lot quality assurance sampling (LQAS) 
technique
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Figure 2. 
Probabilities and the cumulative probability of obtaining an exact number of defective units 
in a sample of 32 from a lot with 15% defective units
Note: The solid line in Figure 2 represents the probabilities (on the Y axis) that a sample of 
32 will result in a specific number of defective units (on the X axis) when taken from a lot in 
which 15% of the units are defective. The probability of obtaining 4 and 5 defective units in 
the sample is greatest—both being approximately 19%. The probability of finding 6 or more 
defective units in the sample decreases steadily. The dotted line is the sum of the 
probabilities from right to left in the figure. This line shows that there is nearly a 0% chance 
of obtaining a sample of 32 with 11 or more defective units if the true number of defects in 
the lot is 15%. The intersection between the horizontal (α = 0.05) and vertical dotted line (9 
defective units in the sample) indicates that obtaining 9 or more defective units in a sample 
of 32 from a lot with 15% will happen less than 5% of the time.
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Figure 3. 
Average and standard deviation of sample fail rates across 75 repeated samples
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Table 2.
Probability that a sample of n PPE units will result in a specific number of defective units when the true 
number of defective units in the lot is 15% and 5%
Sample
Size
Number
of
Failures
Probability (in %)
for a Lot with 15%
Defective Units
Probability (in %)
for a Lot with 5%
Defective Units
10 0 19.7 59.9
1 34.7 31.5
2 27.6 7.5
3 13.0 1.0
4 4.0 0.1
5 0.8 —
6 0.1 —
12 0 14.2 54.0
1 30.1 34.1
2 29.2 9.9
3 17.2 1.7
4 6.8 0.2
5 1.9 —
6 0.4 —
7 0.1 —
18 0 5.4 39.7
1 17.0 37.6
2 25.6 16.8
3 24.1 4.7
4 15.9 0.9
5 7.9 0.1
6 3.0 —
7 0.9 —
8 0.2 —
9 0.0 —
24 0 2.0 29.2
1 8.6 36.9
2 17.4 22.3
3 22.5 8.6
4 20.9 2.4
5 14.7 0.5
6 8.2 0.1
7 3.7 —
8 1.4 —
9 0.4 —
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Sample
Size
Number
of
Failures
Probability (in %)
for a Lot with 15%
Defective Units
Probability (in %)
for a Lot with 5%
Defective Units
10 0.1 —
32 0 0.6 19.4
1 3.1 32.6
2 8.5 26.6
3 15.0 14.0
4 19.0 5.3
5 19.0 1.6
6 15.1 0.4
7 9.9 0.1
8 5.5 —
9 2.6 —
10 1.0 —
11 0.4 —
12 0.1 —
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